Abstract
This paper is adapted from Chapter IV of the author's Ph.D. dissertation. The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments from Therese Flaherty. Hajime Miyazaki, James Rosse, participants in the Stanford Economics Department Workshop in Industrial Organization and Applied Microeconomics, and an anonymous referee. This paper embodies the views of the author and does not represent the views or policy of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
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Shaffer, S. Regulatory inertia and risk reduction. Rev Ind Organ 2, 56–67 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02354366
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02354366