Theory and Decision

, Volume 13, Issue 1, pp 81–90 | Cite as

Double deception: Two against one in three-person games

  • Steven J. Brams
  • Frank C. Zagare


This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better outcome for himself by misrepresenting his preference, while his partner can, this player will find that possessing a monopoly of information will not give him any special advantage. In fact, this analysis demonstrates that he may have incentives to share his information selectively with one or another of his opponents should he alone possess complete information at the outset.


Economic Theory Game Theory Optimal Strategy Complete Information Unexpected Finding 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven J. Brams
    • 1
    • 2
  • Frank C. Zagare
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.New York UniversityNew YorkUSA
  2. 2.Boston UniversityBostonUSA

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