Abstract
In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for collusive outcomes in a single-shot game of simultaneous price choice in a homogeneous product market with symmetric firms and strictly convex costs. We also prove the counterintuitive result: if the second derivative of the cost function is nonincreasing in output, it is easier to sustain collusion when the number of firms increases.
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Dastidar, K.G. Collusive outcomes in price competition. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 73, 81–93 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02339582
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02339582