Public Choice

, Volume 62, Issue 3, pp 217–236 | Cite as

The assurance problem in a laboratory market

  • R. Mark Isaac
  • David Schmidtz
  • James M. Walker
Article

Keywords

Laboratory Market Public Finance Assurance Problem 

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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. Mark Isaac
    • 1
  • David Schmidtz
    • 2
  • James M. Walker
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of ArizonaTucson
  2. 2.Department of PhilosophyYale UniversityNew Haven
  3. 3.Department of EconomicsIndiana UniversityBloomington

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