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J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 2.
Supra n.1, at 2.
Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in-supra n.1, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152.
Supra n.1, at 8.
Supra n.1, at 14.
This agonistic pluralism, then, “is Hobbesian in conceiving the avoidance of war as the rationale of politics, but Machiavellian ... in recognising that success in this project can always be only partial, temporary, and in part a gift of fortune. The agenda of political thought ... is to return topolitics, so conceived”-(supra n.1, at 130). That Gray now describes his position as “agonistic pluralism”, rather than as “agonistic liberalism”, reflects a significant recent development in his thought. In particular, he is at pains to distinguish his most recent position from those of Isaiah Berlin and Joseph Raz, both of whom — notwithstanding their allegiance to value pluralism — continue, he argues, to pursue a liberal agendasotto voce. By contrast, Gray's is a “pluralist perspective ... in whichno privileges are accorded to liberal practice, and the animating project is that of framing terms of harmonious coexistence among different cultures and projects” (supra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995) at viii; my emphasis).
Supra n.1, at 6. It is far from obvious, to put it no more strongly, that thereason the abortion issue has been so divisive in the U.S.A., in contrast to countries such as Britain, isbecause it has been understood in terms of constitutional rights. To begin with, even in countries where abortion has been debated as a political issue, the interlocutors have typically framed their positions by deploying a rights-based moral idiom. Furthermore, there are other, and arguably more significant, reasons why the debate has been especially polarised in the U.S.A. (for example, the influence of the religious right, which is itself far from enamoured with liberal rights discourse).
Supra n.1, at 6. It is, in part, because Gray — following both Sandel and Walzer — so emphatically rejects this “legalistic or jurisprudential paradigm” that he is hostile to Rawls's more recent work (supra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 6). The “new Rawls” is applauded for confessing that his theory of justice rests upon no firmer a foundation than “certain fundamental ideas ... latent in the public political culture of a democratic society” (J. Rawls,Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 175) — or, as Gray would have it, because it is no more than “a distillation of the conventional wisdom of liberal democratic regimes ... [and] of the liberal establishment in North American universities” (supra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 3). However, Gray is less than sanguine regarding the prospects for what he derides as “Kantianism in One Country” (supra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 3). In particular, he argues that the political liberalism of the “new Rawls” is, in its essence,antipolitical: the constitutional enshrinement of individual rights and liberties closes down the democratic space for the resolution of conflictsvia political processes of bargaining, negotiation and compromise, as the judiciary usurps the powers of legislative assemblies (seesupra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 77).
Supra n.1, at 83. Gray has been a well-informed and incisive commentator upon the trials and travails of the post-communist world. See, in particular, “Post-totalitarianism, civil society and the limits of the Western Model”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism, supra n.3 (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, at 156–95, and “Enlightenment, illusion and the fall of the Soviet State”, and “The post-Communist societies in transition”, insupra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 31–33 and 34–36 respectively. See “The End of History — or of liberalism?”, inPost-Liberalism, supra n.3 London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, at 245–250, for a powerful attack upon the Fukuyama Thesis.
SeePost—Liberalism, supra n.3, at 287–328 andsupra n.1 J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 68–71.
That value pluralism is not itself a species of relativism is clear enough: it assumes that a defensible distinction can be drawn between the valuable and the valueless. This doctrine, as Gray points out, is a species ofmoral realism, according to which there are “correct moral beliefs about the world”. “The important point ... is that, if value pluralism is correct, then ... [there] ... aretruths, correct moral beliefs about the world. The thesis of the incommensurability of values is then not a version of relativism, of subjectivism or of moral scepticism, though it will infallibly be confused with one or other of these doctrines: it is a species of moral realism, which we shall callobjective pluralism”-(supra n.1, at 70).
A disclaimer is in order here. Gray's position — as it has been developed in numerous articles over the past two decades — is a complex and constantly shifting one. It is not possible to do it full justice in a short article. There is much that I profoundly disagree with in Gray's work — in particular, his prescriptions for the well-being of “us” liberals — which I have refrained from commenting upon. More generally, I have nothing very much to say about his detailed critiques of either liberalism or Marxism. My principal concern here is with Gray's claim that the twilight of Enlightenment renders incoherent the veryidea of human progress, in both its liberal and Marxian incarnations.
Supra n.1,, at 65.
Supra n.1,, at 65.
Supra n.1,, at 65.
Supra n.8,, at 6. It is, in part, because Gray—following both Sandel and Walzer — so emphatically rejects this “legalistic or jurisprudential paradigm” that he is hostile to Rawls's more recent work (supra n. 1, J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 6). The “new Rawls” is applauded for confessing that his theory of justice rests upon no firmer a foundation than “certain fundamental ideas... latent in the public political culture of a democratic society” (J. Rawls,Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 175) — or, as Gray would have it, because it is no more than “a distillation of the conventional wisdom of liberal democratic regimes... [and] of the liberal establishment in North American universities” (supra n.1, J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 3). However, Gray is less than sanguine regarding the prospects for what he derides as “Kantianism in One Country” (supra n.1, J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 3). In particular, he argues that the political liberalism of the “new Rawls” is, in its essence,antipolitical: the constitutional enshrinement of individual rights and liberties closes down the democratic space for the resolution of conflictsvia political processes of bargaining, negotiation and compromise, as the judiciary usurps the powers of legislative assemblies (seesupra n.1, J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), at 77).
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, insupra n.1,, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152. at 247.
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, insupra n.1,, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 302. It is far from clear precisely which virtues and goods are supposed to be achievable only within such “traditional” societies. However, Gray does give a more or less clear general indication of what he has in mind: “all those virtues and excellences that depend for their existence on hierarchy and deference and on men and women knowing their station and its duties”. Various problems arise here. Firstly, it is not at all clear that, say, “not having ideas above your station” is a virtue. Secondly, and relatedly, it is not at all clear that there are any distinctive and “objective”virtues available only to the untouchables in caste societies, women in patriarchal ones, and so on. Thirdly, the kinds of virtues that Gray has in mind — for example, due deference to authority — can be exercised in the absence of anyinherited inequalities of status. Indeed, where deference is “owed” to someone as a birthright it is not at all clear that the notion ofdue deference is applicable. Finally, even if there are genuine virtues which can be developed and exercised only in “traditional” societies it does not follow that the transition to liberalism and/or socialism is not anyway a progressive one (i.e., on balance a good thing).
Supra n.1,, at 69.
Supra n.1,, at 68–69.
Supra n.1,, at 68–69.
Both Raz's and Gray's formulations do often imply a contrast between value-pluralism and something akin to utilitarianism, in a way that considerably eases their defences of the “pluralist” position. Thus Gray says of the doctrine that it denies that we can appeal to any “overarching standard or principle... common currency or measure, whereby... conflicts can be arbitrated and resolved”supra n.1, at 69); and Raz tells us that value pluralism prohibits any appeal to such standards of commensuration as “happiness, pleasure, desire-satisfaction, or [very vaguely—MR] something else”, (supra n.1, J. Gray,Enlightenment's Wake (London and New York: Routlege, 1995), at 68–69). Indeed, both contrast the “radical choice” forced upon us by value-incommensurablity withrational choice. The development of this latter notion is, however, intimately bound up with utilitarian presuppositions (i.e., those that pervade neo-classical economics). Gray does not give serious consideration to the possibility that choices between “incommensurable” goods (e.g., the balance struck between family and professional life) may be judged better or worse exercises of practical reason without invoking any “common currency or measure” remotely like “happiness, pleasure, desire-satisfaction, or something else”.
Supra n.1, at 69 (my emphasis). No indication whatsoever is given as to which “standard moral theories” it doesnot, in Gray's own view, subvert.
An obvious point needs to be made here. As Gray argues, the doctrine of value pluralism is widely thought to be supportive of liberalism. Thus, discussing Berlin's position, he writes that “[A] liberal society in which moral conflicts are openly revealed is commended to us, not because it alone satisfies the demands of human nature, but because in it the competition of goods which is an unalterable feature of the human predicament is not shirked or evaded, but actively embraced” (J. Gray,Liberalisms (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 65). For him, however, value pluralism is subversive of liberalism for two principle reasons. Firstly, and following Berlin, because conflicts between incommensurables break out within liberal rights discourse itself (e.g., rights to privacyversus freedom of information). And, secondly—a point made, but hardly foregrounded, by Raz—because autonomy-promoting societies drive out those alleged virtues and excellences allegedly realisable only in hierarchical and authoritarian societies.
Notice that, in view of his allegiance to “objective pluralism”, Gray cannot simply point to the fact that peopletake themselves to be living contented and flourishing lives in unequal societies in support of the claim that they arein fact flourishing. Given the recent development of his thought, it is unclear how he would now deal with the problem of the “contented slave”, his original treatment having invoked the value of autonomy (see “Freedom, Slavery and Contentment”,supra n.24,, 65). For him, however, value pluralism is subversive of liberalism for two principle reasons. Firstly, and following Berlin, because conflicts between incommensurables break out within liberal rights discourse itself (e.g., rights to privacyversus freedom of information). And, secondly—a point made, but hardly foregrounded, by Raz—because autonomy-promoting societies drive out those alleged virtues and excellences allegedly realisable only in hierarchical and authoritarian societies, at 69–88).
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assult upon contemporary Anglophon philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Lieberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 302.
Supra n.3 Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 302ff.
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 303ff.
See M. Walzer,Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic books, 1983), esp. chs. I–III, for a position that threatens to collapse into relativism. For a partial recantation of this position, and the introduction of “a kind of minimal and universal moral code”, see hisInterpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987), 24ff. Notice also that, as Gray himself recognises, the introduction of a minimal universal morality supports some notion of the historical progress of the human species: for example, the abolition of slavery must now be judged to be a progressive one.
Supra n.1,, at 81. As Gray acknowledges, he is here following Berlin.
Supra n.1,, at 82–83.
Supra n.1,, at 82.
While in bothPost-Liberalism andEnlightenment's Wake Gray often writes as if economic growth were always and everywhere a good thing, this is difficult to reconcile with his comments upon it inBeyond the New Right (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). Here he declares, at 127, that “[t]hough the eradication of involuntary poverty remains a noble cause, the project of promoting maximal economic growth is, perhaps, the [surely notthe—MR] most vulgar ideal ever put before suffering mankind”.
Supra n.1,, at 82. No clear indication is given as to what he means byweak liberal regimes. In particular, is the U.S.A. such a weak regime?
See hisPost-Liberalism, supra n.3,.
Supra n.29 See, esp. chs. I–III, for a position that threatens to collapse into relativism. For a partial recantation of this position, and the introduction of “a kind of minimal and universal moral code”, see hisInterpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1987), 24ff. Notice also that, as Gray himself recognises, the introduction of a minimal universal morality supports some notion of the historical progress of the human species: for example, the abolition of slavery must now be judged to be a progressive one, above.
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 289. Notice that all those works qualifying as trulygreat works of art will be very few in proportion toall the art produced over the course of human history. Is the same, then, true for cultural history?
Supra n.3, Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is a powerful and entertaining one. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, in, at 11–17. He has also been the most powerful anti-Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in J. Gray,Post-Liberalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 90–98, and J. Gray, “Harnessing the Market”,New Left Review 210 (1995), 147–152, at 289.
Supra n.1,, at 78.
Supra n.1,, at 169.
Thus, Gray attacks Alasdair MacIntyre for attempting to flee the desolation of (post-) modernity for irretrievably lost (and, for him, universalist) premodern traditions. He is fond of invoking Wittgenstein's dictum here: attempting to restore a lost tradition is like attempting to repair a spider's web with one's bare hands. Gray is also, incidentally, at pains to distinguish his position from Rorty's postmodern pragmatism. (For discussion of MacIntyre's and Rorty's positions seesupra n.1,, (ch. 10.)
In view of his commitment to the pursuit of amodus vivendi, some interesting questions arise with regard to Gray's continued defence of a number of neo-conservative proposals for “us” liberals—for example, his preference for privatized welfare services and the “disestablishment of education”. (See, in particular,Beyond the New Right, supra n. 33, While in bothPost-Liberalism andEnlightenment's Wake Gray often writes as if economic growth were always and everywhere a good thing, this is difficult to reconcile with his comments upon it inBeyond the New Right (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). Here he declares, at 127, that “[t]hough the eradication of involuntary poverty remains a noble cause, the project of promoting maximal economic growth is, perhaps, the [surely notthe—MR] most vulgar ideal ever put before suffering mankind”, ch. 1.) Is he setting out his own bargaining position here? After all, such policies would not obviously be conducive to social harmony or to the maintenance of civil order.
Supra n.1,, at 96.
Supra n.1,, at 97. Nor is he any more flattering about European neoliberalism. For a venomous assault upon Thatcherism, from a onetime ally, seesupra n.1,J. Gray,Einglightenment'sWake (London and New York: Routledge, 1995 at 88–89.
Supra n.1,, at 97.
Supra n.1,, at 146.
Supra n.1,, at 104.
Supra n.1,, at 108. Surprisingly, after all this, Gray concludes that “[N]othing advanced here is meant to cast doubt on the centrality and indispensability of market institutions for economic life” (at 116). Perhaps not: but it does much more than cast doubt upon the “indispensability” of capitalism in anything resembling its current incarnation. Gray gives little indication of how he thinks the ascendancy of neo-liberalism might be undone in view of the powerful interests (national and international) that support it. Notice also that Gray tends to discuss “traditions”, at times, as if we had to deal with discrete “forms of life” to a large extent insulated from each other. In fact there has been a globalisation of “culture” over the past century as a result, not so much of the spread of liberalism, as of the spread of capitalism.
Supra n.3,Gray's polemical assault upon contemporary Anglophone philosophical practice is apowerful and entertainingone. See, for example, “Notes towards a definition of the political thought of Tlon”, insupra n.1,J. Gray,Einglightenment's Wake (London and New York: Rout ledge, 1995) at 11–16, He has also been the most powerful anti—Marxist critic of the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen, John Roemer and Jon Elster. See, in particular, “The Academic Romance of Marxism”, in.
F. Fukuyama, “The End of History?”,The National Interest 16 (1989), 17–18.
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This article started out as a review piece. I should like to thank Routledge for making available review copies of the works discussed in it. I have, incidentally, published a review of Gray'sEnlightenment's Wake: see Radical Philosophy 79 (1996), 41–44.
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Roberts, M. The endurance of history? Reflections on John Gray's post-enlightenment pluralism. Res Publica 3, 185–212 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02333604
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02333604