Atlantic Economic Journal

, Volume 24, Issue 1, pp 33–42 | Cite as

Structural change in federal spending and deficits: Legislative and cyclical influences

  • Timothy J. Perri
  • Gary L. Shelley
Articles
  • 18 Downloads

Abstract

This paper analyzes the behavior of federal expenditures and budget deficits since 1955. It is found that growth in these series is well described by two simple step functions allowing for three discrete increases in the means of the variables. When adjusted for the changes in means, both series are stationary with no significant time trend. It is found that the increases in means are associated with government attempts to implement countercyclical fiscal policy during recessions. Also, the increases in means coincide well with specific legislative acts which increased the budgetary power of individual members of Congress and ended the ability of the president to use impoundment as a substitute for a line-item veto.

Keywords

International Economic Public Finance Time Trend Step Function Significant Time 

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References

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Copyright information

© Atlantic Economic Society 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Timothy J. Perri
    • 1
  • Gary L. Shelley
    • 1
  1. 1.Appalachian State UniversityUSA

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