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Such as the view that analyticity is always relative to a language, which is ably defended by Professor R. M. Martin in his article “On ‘Analytic’,”Philosophical Studies, 3:42–47 (April 1952). If Professor Martin's view is correct—as I believe it to be—then a fortion the conclusions of the present article are correct also.
In this essay I shall be concerned only with such analytical philosophers as Russell, Moore, and Broad. My remarks are not directed toward the Oxford-centered writers of the ordinary language cult, for whom the term ‘analytical philosophers’ does not seem altogether appropriate.
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Third Dialogue. Berkeley's view has been reformulated by latter-day phenomenalists as a (contextual)definition of the term ‘material thing’ or ‘physical object.’ Cf. A. J. Ayer,Language, Truth and Logic, pp. 54ff; “Phenomenalism,” Aristotelian Society Proceedings, 47:169 (1946-47); and Paul Marhenke, “Phenomenalism,”Philosophical Analysis (edited by Max Black), pp. 299ff.
“On Denoting,”Mind, n.s. 14:479-93 (1905). Reprinted inReadings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, pp. 103-15.
Methods of Logic, p. 224. Cf. also Quine's “On What There Is,”Review of Metaphysics, 2:21–38 (1948).
Scientific Thought, p. 18.
The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 263-69.
Language, Truth and Logic, p. 68.
Ibid., p. 59.
Smith's College Chemistry, by James Kendall, p. 268.
A more detailed discussion of this type of definition is presented in Chapter 4 of myIntroduction to Logic.
Op. cit., First Dialogue.
Principia Ethica, pp. 6–7.
Op. cit., p. 14.
Review by Morton G. White,Journal of Symbolic Logic, 13:126 (June 1948).
“A Defense of Common Sense,” by G. E. Moore, inContemporary British Philosophy (Second Series), edited by J. H. Muirhead (London: Allen and Unwin, 1925), p. 217.
“Moore's Theory of Sense-Data,” by O. K. Bouwsma, inThe Philosophy of G. E. Moore, edited by P. A. Schilpp (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1942), pp. 203-21.
“William James’ ‘Pragmatism’,” by G. E. Moore, inPhilosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922, 1948), pp. 97–146.
As inMysticism and Logic, by Bertrand Russell (New York: W. W. Norton, 1929). See especially pp. 126ff.
Experience and Prediction, by Hans Reichenbach (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 164.
Op. cit.
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, by John Dewey (New York: Holt, 1938), p. 151.
, p. 17.
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Copi, I.M. Analytical philosophy and analytical propositions. Philos Stud 4, 87–93 (1953). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02309584
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02309584