Philosophical Studies

, Volume 8, Issue 4, pp 49–54 | Cite as

Self-referential justification

  • Paul F. Schmidt
Article
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Notes

  1. 1.
    H. Feigl, “De Principiis Non Disputandum,”Philosophical Analysis, ed. by M. Black (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950) and “Validation and Vindication,”Readings in Ethical Theory, ed. by Sellars and Hospers (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    I take this usage from F. B. Fitch, “Self-Reference in Philosophy,”Mind, 55:64–73 (1946); reprinted as appendix C in hisSymbolic Logic (New York: Ronald Press, 1952). I owe the idea of self-referential justification to this essay.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Mind, 62:289–300 (1953).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Ibid., p. 291.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Mind, p. 291.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Mind, 62:292 (1953).Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Ibid., p. 292.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Review of Metaphysics, 6:203, 205 (1952).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    This definition is adapted from Fitch; cf.Symbolic Logic, p. 219.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    “On the Self-Reference of a Meaning Theory,” {jtPhilosophical Studies}, 4:69–70 (1953).Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Ledger Wood,The Analysis of Knowledge (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), pp. 193–203.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Johnson Reprint Corporation 1957

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul F. Schmidt
    • 1
  1. 1.Oberlin CollegeUSA

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