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Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach

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Abstract

In this paper, we provide a coalitional alternative to the perfectly competitive and purely non-cooperative assumptions commonly employed in the modelling of commodity markets. These assumptions of perfect competition or pure non-cooperation are usually imposed exogenously without providing an economic basis for assuming why firms that could stand to gain by cooperating would not in fact do so. Three behavioral rules embodied in three different cooperative games are discussed in this paper and a methodology for predicting the coalition structures that would result from each of these is offered. By applying these games to the US copper industry of the 1970's, we show that the theory of games can be profitably employed in conjunction with the traditional “institutional approach” of industrial organization to yield useful economic predictions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Administrative Sciences, University of Wisconsin-Parkside, School of Business, Wood Road, Box 2000, 53141, Kenosha, Wisconsin, USA

    R. Rajan (Associate Professor)

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  1. R. Rajan
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The author is grateful to two anonymous referees whose comments led to a considerably improved version of the paper.

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Rajan, R. Modelling non-competitive behavior in commodity markets: A game theoretic approach. Empirical Economics 15, 347–366 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02307287

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