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Discriminatory government procurement with a content requirement: Its protective effects and welfare costs

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References

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This paper has benefited from the helpful comments of Stephen T. Easton.

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Herander, M.G. Discriminatory government procurement with a content requirement: Its protective effects and welfare costs. Atlantic Economic Journal 14, 20–29 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02303507

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