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Theory of protectionism fluctuations caused by a support-maximizing government

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Abstract

Fluctuations of protectionism are explained in a model with a political support-maximizing government and a small group of pro-protectionist producers. Due to elections, the government changes the level of protection, though there are no variations in preferences for protection.

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Sieg, G. Theory of protectionism fluctuations caused by a support-maximizing government. Atlantic Economic Journal 23, 304–309 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298766

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298766

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