Skip to main content
Log in

Assessing the costs of European monetary union

  • Articles
  • Published:
Atlantic Economic Journal Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Much has been made of the importance of asymmetric shocks in arguing against European Monetary Union (EMU). But such shocks are entirely consistent with better monetary policy under EMU. A single money represents the perfect answer to asymmetric shocks coming from currency substitution. In addition, many asymmetric shocks cannot properly be handled through monetary policy; others will not be so because of information problems; still others because of policy mistakes. Some strategic factors also favor EMU if shocks are symmetric. Finally, doubts about the effectiveness of monetary policy in Europe should be kept in mind. On these numerous grounds, little weight can be assigned to criticisms of EMU based on mere asymmetry in the shocks.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bayoumi, Tamim; Eichengreen, Barry. "Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Union," in Francisco Torres; Francesco Giavazzi, eds.,Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 193–229.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bayoumi, Tamim; Prasad, Eswar. "Currency Unions, Economic Fluctuations and Adjustments: Some Empirical Evidence," CEPR Working Paper no. 1172, May 1995.

  • Bini-Smaghi, Lorenzo; Vori, Silvia. "Rating the EC as an Optimum Currency Areas: Is It Worse than the U.S.?," Banca d'Italia, 1992, mimeo.

  • Canzoneri, Matthew; Henderson, Dale.Monetary Policies in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.

    Google Scholar 

  • Erkel-Rousse, Hélène; Mélitz, Jacques. "New Empirical Evidence on the Costs of European Monetary Union," in Sylvester Eijffinger; Harry Huizinga, eds.,Positive Political Economy: Theory and Evidence, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (also CEPR Working Paper no. 1169, May 1995).

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. "One Market, One Money,"European Economy, 44, 1990.

  • Feldstein, Martin. "The Case Against EMU,"The Economist, June 13, 1992.

  • Krugman, Paul. "Lessons of Massachusetts for EMU," in Francisco Torres; Francesco Giavazzi, eds.,Adjustment and Growth in the European Monetary Union, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 241–61.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masson, Paul; Symansky, Steve. "Evaluating the EMS and EMU Using Stochastic Simulations: Some Issues," in Ray Barrell; John Whitley, eds.,Macroeconomic Policy Coordination in Europe, London: NIESR, 1993, ch. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meese, Richard. "Currency Fluctuations in the Post-Bretton Woods Era,"Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 1, Winter 1990, pp. 117–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mélitz, Jacques; Weber, Axel. "The Costs/Benefits of a Common Monetary Policy in France and Germany and Possible Lessons for Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1374, April 1996.

  • Mill, John Stuart.Principles of Political Economy, first ed. 1848, W. J. Ashley ed., 1909.

  • Oudiz, Gilles; Sachs, Jeffrey. "Macroeconomic Policy Coordination among the Industrial Economies"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1984, pp. 1–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stockman, Alan. "Sectoral and National Aggregate Disturbances to Industrial Output in Seven European Countries,"Journal of Monetary Economics, 21, 2/3, March/May 1988, pp. 343–60.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Mélitz, J. Assessing the costs of European monetary union. Atlantic Economic Journal 24, 269–280 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298431

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02298431

Keywords

Navigation