An empirical analysis of the U.S. Senate vote on NAFTA and GATT

  • Nipoli Kamdar
  • Jorge G. Gonzalez


This paper examines the determinants of the voting behavior of the U.S. Senate on the North American Free Trade Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Public choice theory suggests that the voting behavior of senators is influenced by constituent interests, special interest politics, and their ideology. This paper uses probit analysis to test the significance of the above factors. The results indicate that constituent economic interests and special interest money were significant determinants of the Senate voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement but not on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.


Economic Growth Special Interest Empirical Analysis International Economic Public Choice 
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Copyright information

© International Atlantic Economic Society 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nipoli Kamdar
    • 1
  • Jorge G. Gonzalez
    • 1
  1. 1.Trinity UniversityU.S.A

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