Abstract
The democratic political system emerging in the new South Africa is not a sufficient condition to secure a stable society. The structure and composition of intergovernmental fiscal relations will become a very important dimension of public sector reform for the future South Africa. Historically, the South African government has been highly centralized. 1994 will record the beginning of the devolution and sharing of important responsibilities to subnational governments and the planning and implementation of new decentralized arrangements. Whether the new dispensation will adhere to the general economic principles of fiscal decentralization will in the first instance depend on the principles enshrined in the new constitution. The aim of this paper is to differentiate several key drivers which reflect upon the ability of the Government of National Unity to break away from the deeply ingrained institutions of apartheid. The paper starts with some constitutional issues relative to intergovernmental fiscal relations and economic performance. Second, I provide an overview of the theory of intergovernmental fiscal relations and examine the implications for the design of an intergovernmental financial system. Third, the current structure of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa is sketched. Fourth, I review the current output of the constitutionally established Fiscal and Finance Commission which serves as an advisory body to parliament to ensure greater transparency, efficiency, consistency, and predictability of fiscal policy. Finally, the paper concludes with some challenges ahead.
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Adams, I. South African fiscal relations. International Advances in Economic Research 3, 54–70 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02295001
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02295001