Psychometrika

, Volume 45, Issue 4, pp 411–424 | Cite as

Statistics as psychometrics

  • Melvin R. Novick
Article

Abstract

In this paper, modern statistics is considered as a branch of psychometrics and the question of how the central problems of statistics can be resolved using psychometric methods is investigated. Theories and methods developed in the fields of test theory, scaling, and factor analysis are related to the principle problems of modern statistical theory and method. Topics surveyed include assessment of probabilities, assessment of utilities, assessment of exchangeability, preposterior analysis, adversary analysis, multiple comparisons, the selection of predictor variables, and full-rank ANOVA. Reference is made to some literature from the field of cognitive psychology to indicate some of the difficulties encountered in probability and utility assessment. Some methods for resolving these difficulties using the Computer-Assisted Data Analysis (CADA) Monitor are described, as is some recent experimental work on utility assessment.

Key words

Bayesian decision theory utility theory computer assisted data analysis 

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Reference notes

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Copyright information

© The Psychometric Society 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Melvin R. Novick
    • 1
  1. 1.Lindquist Center for MeasurementUniversity of IowaIowa City

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