A comparison of game theory and learning theory

Abstract

It is shown that Estes' formula for the asymptotic behavior of a subject under conditions of partial reinforcement can be derived from the assumption that the subject is behaving rationally in a certain game-theoretic sense and attempting to minimax his regret. This result illustrates the need for specifying the frame of reference or set of the subject when using the assumption of rationality to predict his behavior.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

References

  1. 1.

    Thrall, R. M., Coombs, C. H., and Davis, R. L. (Eds.) Decision processes. New York: Wiley, 1954.

    Google Scholar 

  2. 2.

    Estes, W. K. Individual behavior in uncertain situations: an interpretation in terms of statistical association theory. In (1), chap. 9.

  3. 3.

    Flood, M. W. Game-learning theory and some decision-making experiments. In (1), chap. 10.

  4. 4.

    Flood, M. W. Environmental non-stationarity in a sequential decision-making experiment. In (1), chap. 18.

  5. 5.

    Simon, H. A. A behavioral model of rational choice.Quart. J. Econ.,69, 1955, 99–118.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Simon, H.A. A comparison of game theory and learning theory. Psychometrika 21, 267–272 (1956). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02289136

Download citation

Keywords

  • Public Policy
  • Asymptotic Behavior
  • Game Theory
  • Statistical Theory
  • Learning Theory