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On the self-reference of a meaning-theory

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Notes

  1. Elements of Analytic Philosophy (New York: Macmillan, 1949) pp. 341f.

  2. Leveled by A. C. Ewing in “Meaninglessness,”Mind, 46:349 (1937).

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  3. Elements of Analytic Philosophy, p. 342.

  4. Ibid., p. 341.

  5. Ibid., p. 342.

  6. In this case we may wish to lay down a general principle whereby we can assure the avoidance of certain known paradoxes. But even for this purpose it would be well worth while to examine the sort of sentences of natural languages which do lead to paradoxes, with an eye to finding general characteristics of these sentences which are not also characteristics (as is self-reference) of some logically unobjectionable sentences.

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  1. Harvard University, USA

    Robert J. Richman

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  1. Robert J. Richman
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Richman, R.J. On the self-reference of a meaning-theory. Philos Stud 4, 69–72 (1953). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02286343

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02286343

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