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Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 1–29 | Cite as

Market structure, opportunity costs, and tax avoidance

  • Jeffrey P. Baldani
  • Don E. Waldman
Article
  • 68 Downloads

Abstract

There have been several studies examining the relationship between an industry's market structure and its ability to affect political outcomes. These studies have assumed that political outcomes are likely to be influenced by a variety of traditional market structure characteristics, but these studies have ignored the impact of differences in the opportunity cost of lobbying that undoubtedly exist across industries. A model is developed that directly incorporates the opportunity cost of lobbying for tax breaks. Using data on tax avoidance rates in 1963, it is then suggested that in industries with high opportunity costs of lobbying, fewer tax benefits were received.

Keywords

Structure Characteristic Opportunity Cost Industrial Organization Market Structure Traditional Market 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Industrial Organization Society University of Southern Indiana 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jeffrey P. Baldani
    • 1
  • Don E. Waldman
    • 1
  1. 1.Colgate UniversityUSA

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