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The terminology of the soul (attā): A psychiatric recasting

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Abstract

Among all the beliefs of the Theravāda Buddhist tradition, none has stirred more controversy than theanattā doctrine. This teaching suggests that nowhere can a substantial self be apprehended. On the contrary, belief in a fixed, unitive self is to be regarded as an ineluctable condition for the emergence of suffering (dukkha). Only when such a truth is grasped by means of wisdom (panñā) can the perennial peace of Nibbāna be found. By providing a model of understanding drawn mainly from psychoanalytic and clinical practice, this essay purports to illumine the pathology of exaggerated self-entitlement (narcissism) rampant during the age of the historical Buddha, and the latter's reaction against it by means of theanattā doctrine.

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References

  1. The idea of an immortal soul is a firmly established traditional belief of Christians, but it is a belief that has entered Christian thinking through the influence of Greek philosophy and is being viewed, more and more, as alien to what the Bible teaches about the nature and destiny of man. For example, Karl Barth suggests that we must make an earnest effort to move beyond the non-biblical dualistic notion of a “soul” with the body. See hisChurch Dogmatics, vol. 3, part 2. Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1961, p. 383; while Paul Tillich, that other theological giant, insists that soul theory must be rejected as a supersition not consonant with the biblical notion of “eternal life”. See hisSystematic Theology, vol. 3. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 437. How current Christian doctrine will continue to deal with the growing dis-ease concerning the notion of the soul's immortality remains an open issue. It may have to close options in another direction after a serious encounter with the Buddhist doctrine of soullessness (anatta).

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  43. In psychiatric terms it would have led Vacchagotta to an exaggerated underestimation of his self and, consequently, to a state of melancholy or anxiety about his existential situation.

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  46. The capacity for reaching this “empathic participation” is the goal of many subjects of meditation, among which mention is often made of the four Sublime States, what are called theBrahmavihāra. For an extensive treatment of these “divine states”, seeThe Path of Purity, op. cit., chapter 9, in which Buddhaghosa gives a brilliant exposition of their development. Included in his treatment iskarunā, or compassion for all living things.

  47. It should be noted, however, that reaching this transcendental realm of mental attunement to what truly is (yathābhūtam) does not negate the world; for both the transcendental or pure realm of ātmanless perception and the mundane realm arede facto one, but epistemologically different.

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Roccasalvo, J.F. The terminology of the soul (attā): A psychiatric recasting. J Relig Health 21, 206–218 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02274180

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