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Journal of Quantitative Criminology

, Volume 13, Issue 4, pp 373–404 | Cite as

The changing of the guard: Top management characteristics, organizational strain, and antitrust offending

  • Sally S. Simpson
  • Christopher S. Koper
Article

Abstract

From within an organizational strain perspective, this paper examines the effects of managerial succession, CEO background, decentralized management, and product dominant strategies on the reported corporate antitrust offending levels of 43 basic manufacturing companies over a 22-year period. In the aggregate, findings suggest that past illegal involvement predicts future offending; companies headed by finance and administrative CEOs have higher offending levels than do firms headed by CEOs from other backgrounds; a turnover in top management generally decreases offending levels; the pursuit of product dominant strategies increases the number of anticompetitive acts; and offending levels are unrelated to whether new leaders are recruited from within or outside the firm, whether the CEO is also Chair of the Board of Directors, or whether management is centralized or decentralized. The effects of some variables on corporate offending interact with firm performance.

Key words

intraorganizational strain antitrust top management characteristics pooled cross-sectional time series 

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Copyright information

© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sally S. Simpson
    • 1
  • Christopher S. Koper
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Criminology and Criminal JusticeUniversity of MarylandCollege Park
  2. 2.The Urban InstituteWashington, DC

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