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Interpreting axiomatic (decision) theory

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A study is made of the use of axiomatic methods in theories of social phenomena.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Templeton College and Sub-Faculty of Economics, University of Oxford, OX1 5NY, Oxford, UK

    Paul Anand

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Anand, P. Interpreting axiomatic (decision) theory. Ann Oper Res 23, 91–101 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02204840

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