Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 23, Issue 1, pp 65–90 | Cite as

Preference reversal: Explanations, evidence and implications

  • Graham Loomes


During the past twenty years, the preference reversal phenomenon has excited much interest among decision theorists. Is it an expression of genuinely nontransitive preferences? Is it largely due to the different cognitive procedures individuals may use for valuations as opposed to choices? Or does it arise from failures of the independence axiom and/or the reduction principle interacting with certain features of many experimental designs? This paper considers these possible explanations, reviews a range of recent evidence and presents some new results.


Decision Theorist Preference Reversal Reversal Phenomenon Independence Axiom Reduction Principle 
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Copyright information

© J.C. Baltzer AG, Scientific Publishing Company 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Graham Loomes
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Experimental EconomicsUniversity of YorkYorkUK

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