Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A note on Carnap's “Truth and confirmation”

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. Published inReadings in Philosophical Analysis, H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949), pp. 119–27.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Ibid., p. 121.

  3. For detailed explanations of the concept of extensionality and related concepts see Carnap'sMeaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 46–52.

  4. The term “true” when applied to propositions does not refer to the semantical concept mentioned above, but to another “absolute” concept. For a discussion of the relationship between the semantical and absolute concepts of truth see Carnap'sIntroduction to Semantics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 88–95.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wisconsin, Wisconsin

    Leonard Linsky

Authors
  1. Leonard Linsky
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Linsky, L. A note on Carnap's “Truth and confirmation”. Philos Stud 1, 81–82 (1950). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199408

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199408

Search

Navigation