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Thus, if the words of written English were restricted in shape to the regular plane figures, and all its expressions consisted of such figures arranged in a one-dimensional order, then it would be possible, though by no means convenient, to use this method of selecting designations for token-classes. One would speak of the token-class square, the token-class circle, and, perhaps, of the token-classsquircle, defined as the series consisting of a square followed by a circle. To remind us that the class square is not a token-class merely by virtue of being the class square, but rather by virtue of playing a certain role in a language, we would probably add a device of some kind to all class terms which were used to designate token-classes.
The use of the term “type” in connection with linguistic expressions as abstract identities (contrasted with particular linguistic events or “tokens”) is due to C. S. Peirce. “Type” has become a familiar technical term in current discussions of language. Unfortunately, it has come to connote both (1) the most significant sense in which two expressions can be said to be “the same expression” (“they are tokens of the same type!”) and (2) qualitative resemblance of linguistic events. This double connotation is possible only so long as linguistic roles are not clearly distinguished from the token-classes which enact them. (Undoubtedly an ill-conceived but siren nominalism is dominating much current thought on these questions.) Once these distinctions are clearly drawn, a choice must be made. Since the term “token-class” is so obviously suited for referring to resemblance families of linguistic tokens, I am adopting the convention of using “type” where I have been using “role,” for it is linguistic roles that conform to the first of the two elements we distinguished above in the usual connotation of the word “type.”
For a brief statement of the “paradox” and a survey of the literature which has accumulated concerning it, see Rudolf Carnap,Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), pp. 63–64. For an acute criticism of Carnap's own solution in terms of “intensional isomorphism” see C. Lewy's review ofMeaning and Necessity in Mind, n.s., 58:228-38 (April 1949).
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Sellars, W. The identity of linguistic expressions and the paradox of analysis. Philos Stud 1, 24–31 (1950). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199404
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02199404