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Philosophical Studies

, Volume 2, Issue 1, pp 7–11 | Cite as

Toward a naturalistic “Non-Naturalistic” ethic

  • May Brodbeck
Article

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Notes

  1. 1.
    That I do not use “good” to mean “intrinsically good” and why I do not will become clear in the sequel. But “good” is a one-term predicate, not a relation.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    This point has been made by Gustav Bergmann. See his “Undefined Descriptive Predicates,”Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 8 (1947), especially pp. 81–82. Also “Logical Positivism” inA History of Philosophical Systems, V. Ferm, ed. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950).Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1942), p. 589.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Compare the gestalt psychologists' insistence that such properties as well as meaning and value are “in the world.” But their psychological insight is frequently vitiated by an accompanying idealistic metaphysic about meaning.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    W. K. Frankena, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,”Mind, vol. 48 (1939).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    I have profited in my thinking on these things from frequent discussion with Professor W. S. Sellars. See also his “Language, Rules and Bahevior,” inJohn Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, S. Hook ed. (New York: Dial Press, 1950).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Johnson Reprint Corporation 1951

Authors and Affiliations

  • May Brodbeck
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MinnesotaUSA

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