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“Rules” of language

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Notes

  1. These conclusions agree with certain statements of Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollacz, 1936), pp. 88–89), e.g. “the phrase ‘is true’ is logically superfluous,” but differ in stressing the distinction between propositions and statements. Ayer says that “the term ‘true’ and ‘false’ connote nothing, but function … simply as marks of assertion and denial. And in that case there can be no sense in asking us to analyse the concept of ‘truth’. But this “function” cannot be dismissed as trivial. Even if “ ‘Queen Anne is dead’ is true” does not mean more than “Queen Anne is dead,” is does more: it converts a proposition into a statement.

  2. I owe this point to Professor Gilbert Ryle.

  3. “Values in Speaking,”Philosophy, 25:20–39 (January 1950).

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  1. University of Birmingham, USA

    Bernard Mayo

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  1. Bernard Mayo
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Mayo, B. “Rules” of language. Philos Stud 2, 1–7 (1951). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02198231

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02198231

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