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On strictly proper equilibria

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Abstract

In this paper, an example is given to show that a strictly perfect equilibrium need not be strictly proper It is proved that, for a bimatrix game, a strictly perfect equilibrium is strictly proper if it is also quasistrong. Finally, for such games, the structure of the set of strictly proper equilibria is described.

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Communicated by G. P. Papavassilopoulos

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Jansen, M.J.M., Vermeulen, A.J. On strictly proper equilibria. J Optim Theory Appl 88, 123–137 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02192025

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