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Annals of Operations Research

, Volume 40, Issue 1, pp 195–207 | Cite as

Hotelling's duopoly on a tree

  • H. A. Eiselt
Article

Abstract

This paper considers Hotelling's duopoly model on a tree. It is shown that if both competitors have price and location as decision variables, no equilibrium exists. If prices are fixed in advance by the competitors, equilibria may exist. Conditions for this case are developed. Then the related sequential location problem is investigated. It is shown that it is usually beneficial for a facility not to locate first but to react to its competitor's location choice.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Market Share Facility Location Profit Function Market Area 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© J.C. Baltzer AG, Scientific Publishing Company 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. A. Eiselt
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of AdministrationUniversity of New BrunswickFrederictonCanada

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