Abstract
The most important power indices are presented. The effectiveness of these indicators is discussed with reference to description of political and financial events. Some recent studies and applications are shown.
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Gambarelli, G. Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review. Ann Oper Res 51, 163–173 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032761
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02032761