Abstract
This paper provides some differential game models of natural resource exploitation when environmental pollution takes place. The “classical” approach to determine optimal harvest rates of renewable resources utilizes Optimal Control models, i.e. there is either a monopolistic market structure or there is pure competition. In case of pollution, however, all agents can be put together, forming the groups of the resource harvesters on one side and of polluters on the other side. So differential games can be used to analyze environmental problems. The models introduced in this paper are put together in order to showdifferent problems that can all be analyzed using differential games.
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Schäfer, M. Exploitation of natural resources and pollution. Ann Oper Res 54, 237–262 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02031736
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02031736