Abstract
A decision theoretic problem is considered which arises in the context of monitoring point sources of pollution: The management of an industrial plant may be authorized to release per unit time some amount of pollutants into the environment, for example air or water. An environmental agency may control, i.e. decide with the help of randomly sampled measurements, whether or not the real releases are larger than the permitted ones. The analysis of the problem of determining the “best” inspection procedure is performed with the help of a non-cooperative two-person game and can be constructed as follows: For a given value of the false alarm probability, only a zero-sum game has to be considered, where the probability of detecting illegal behavior is the payoff to the inspector. The solution of this game, i.e. the best inspection procedure, is then determined by use of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
L. Wicke,Umweltökomomie — Eine praxisorientierte Einführung, 2nd ed. (Verlag Franz Vahlen, München, 1989) pp. 214–221.
R. Avenhaus,Safeguards Systems Analysis (Plenum Press, New York/London, 1986).
A. Karmann, Principal-Agent-Modelle und Risikoallokation — Einige Grundprinzipien, Wirtschaftswiss. Studien 21, Heft. 11(1992)557–562.
K. Segerson, Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control, J. Env. Econ. Manag. 15(1988)87–98.
G.R. Russell, Game models for structuring monitoring and enforcement systems, Natural Resource Modeling 4(1990)143–173.
R. Avenhaus and A. Okada, Inspector leadership games with incomplete information, Discussion Paper 17 of the Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Forschung an der Universität Bielefeld (July 1988).
R. Selten, Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games, Int. J. Game Theory 4(1975)22–55.
H. von Stackelberg,Marktform und Gleichgewicht (Springer, Berlin, 1934).
M. Maschler, A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game, Nav. Res. Log. Quart. 13(1966)11–33.
R. Avenhaus and B. von Stengel, Verification of attribute and variables: Perfect equilibria and inspector leadership, in:Defense Decision Making, Analytical Support and Crisis Management, ed. R. Avenhaus, H. Karkar and M. Rudnianski (Springer, Heidelberg, 1991) pp. 296–317.
V.K. Rohatgi,An Introduction to Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics (Wiley, New York, 1976).
R. Avenhaus, H.-P. Battenberg and B.-J. Falkowski, Optimal tests for data verification, Oper. Res. 39(1991)341–348.
A Graßhoff, Überwachung punktförmiger Schadstoffquellen — Vergleich zweier statistischer Überwachungsprozeduren, Diplomarbeit, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (1991).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Avenhaus, R. Decision theoretic analysis of pollutant emission monitoring procedures. Ann Oper Res 54, 23–38 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02031725
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02031725