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A possibility-free logic of descriptions

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References

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, 92717, Irvine, CA, USA

    Ermanno Bencivenga

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  1. Ermanno Bencivenga
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Bencivenga, E. A possibility-free logic of descriptions. Arch math Logik 24, 159–165 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02007147

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02007147

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