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Verificationism and a causal account of meaning

Into that region [of idols, images, and illusion] the Sophist made his escape, and when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood.-The Sophist, 260

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Stampe, D. Verificationism and a causal account of meaning. Synthese 69, 107–137 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01988289

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