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Synthese

, Volume 69, Issue 1, pp 81–106 | Cite as

The sense-reference distinction in Indian philosophy of language

  • Mark Siderits
Article

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Notes

  1. 1.
    gnJohn J. McDowell: ‘On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,’Mind LXXVI, pp159–85.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    The contrast I have in mind here is this: One's dog may come to associate the name ‘Emily’ with Emily, and in this sense may be said to know who Emily is; but one's dog cannot be said to have the knowledge that ‘Emily’ denotes Emily, or that ‘Emily’ denotes the smallest adult Abyssinian in Bloomington, etc.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    The Pramānavārttikam of Dharmakīrti (hereafter PV), Raniero Gnoli (ed.), Istituto Italiano per il Medio od Estremo Oriente, Rome, 1960.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    PV, p. 25.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    PV, p. 25.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Compare David Kaplan's account of a Fregean theory of demonstrations in, ‘Demonstratives’, unpublished typescript, 1977, pp. 36–39.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Nathan U. Salmon: 1979, ‘Review of Leonard Linsky,Names and Descriptions’,Journal of Philosophy 76, 436–52.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    It should be clear that theapoha theory also yields a solution to the informativeness puzzle when it is couched (as Frege couched it) in terms of proper names. Several centuries after Dharmakīrti his Tibetan Buddhist successors formulated the problem in just this way and used the approach I have described here to solve it. This is discussed in a paper by Tom Tillemans, ‘Identity and Opacity of Reference in Tibetan Buddhist Logic’, which was presented at the fifth annual conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Oxford, August 1982.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    In what follows, ‘designates’ and ‘names’ will be used as synonymous with ‘refers’.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    The terms ‘related designation’ and ‘designated relation’ are readily confused. The designated relation theory (abhihitānvayavāda) is the theory that those things which are designated by the words of a sentence are subsequently placed in relation. The related designation theory (anvitābhidhānavāda) is the theory that what is designated by a word in a sentence is already related. Thus the two names can be tied to the respective theories if ‘designated relation’ is thought of as the relation of what is already designated, and ‘related designation’ is thought of as the designation of what is already related.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    These are examined in greater detail in my ‘Thexxxx Theory of Related Designation’, in B. K. Matilal and J. L. Shaw (eds.),Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective, Reidel, 1985, pp. 253–297.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    In ‘Infinite Sets, Unbound Competences, and Models of Mind’,Perception and Cognition, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), pp. 183–200, Robert Schwartz attacks some recent formulations of the infinite resources, finite capacity argument. Richard Grandy formulates a version of the argument that appears immune to Schwartz' criticism in ‘Semantics Intentions and Linguistic Structures’,Notre Dame Journal of Philosophical Logic 23, 329–30.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Compare Dummett's linking of the context principle and Frege's endorsement of contextual definition inFrege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, London (1981), p. 496.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    There is, of course, a sense in which if one knows that every prime number greater than two is odd, then one knows of each prime number greater than two that it is odd. But this is not a sufficiently strong sense of knowledge de re to satisfy the opponent on his own terms. What he demands is that the speaker be causally related in a cognitively significant but nonconceptual way to each of the infinitely many relational complexes. This demand cannot be satisfied, hence the Prābhākara move to propositional cognition as a way of showing that the speaker does know all these complexes in a way, namely the knowledge-that way. The distinction I am appealing to here is that used by Aristotle to solve theMeno paradox of knowledge inPosterior Analytics I.). It is also related to thede re/de dicto distinction as drawn by Burge in ‘BeliefDe Re’,Journal of Philosophy,LXXIV, 338–62.]Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Frege: Philosophy of Language, pp. 174–7.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark Siderits
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyIllinois State UniversityNormalUSA

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