Papers of the Regional Science Association

, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp 113–139 | Cite as

Tiebout models of community structure

  • James L. Barr
Urban Models


Community Structure Tiebout Model 
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Copyright information

© The Regional Science Association 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • James L. Barr
    • 1
  1. 1.Washington L. UniversityWashingtonUSA

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