The common property resource problem and the fisheries of Barbados and Jamaica

Abstract

Common property resources (CPR) tend to be particularly susceptible to depletion and degredation. This creates problems for sustainable development and for resource stewardship in general since many of the key global resources are common property. The article explores the different definitions of CPR and the traps associated with the harvesting of CPR without understanding the social, economic, and environmental costs related to their exploitation. The commons problem may be approached in terms of a private property solution, the allocation of individual quotas to fishermen, or a communal property solution in which communities of fishermen basically manage their own fisheries. The offshore fishery of Barbados lends itself to the private property solution, and the inshore fishery of Jamaica, to the communal property solution.

Drawing from case studies of Jamaica and Barbados fisheries, four principles of CPR use are proposed: (a) the solution of the CPR problem starts with the control of access to the resource, (b) increasing production from a CPR depends on the conservation of the resource base, (c) the sustainable utilization of a CPR is closely connected to the use of technology appropriate for the harvest, and (d) local-level management improves prospects for the sustainable use of a CPR. The case studies illustrate that there may be local, national, and international levels of interest over the resource. Hence, the successful management of such resources as Barbados and Jamaica fisheries requires that conflicting demands for the resources be taken into account, perhaps using a cooperative management approach.