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What never occurred to Jones: A comment on the analysis of knowledge

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Notes

  1. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1974, pp. 221–222. The passage employs an example of Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, Jr., from ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’,Journal of Philosophy lxvi (1969), 228–229.

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  2. p. 221.

  3. My argument here, I think, reflects what is correct in Arthur Danto's claim that the reason that knowing thatp does not entail knowing that one knows thatp is that to know that one knows presupposes understanding what knowledge is. See Danto's ‘On Knowing that We Know’, inEpistemology: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge (ed. by Avrum Stroll), Harper and Row, New York, 1967. But I daresay thathow Danto is correct never occurred to Danto himself, and so Danto no more than Lehrer has ever known or even believed that he has known anything, though I am sure has often known and believed that he (ashe at the time might have put it) ‘knows’ something.

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  1. University of Singapore, Singapore

    B. L. Blose

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  1. B. L. Blose
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Blose, B.L. What never occurred to Jones: A comment on the analysis of knowledge. Philos Stud 31, 205–209 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01855294

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