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De Economist

, Volume 140, Issue 1, pp 109–139 | Cite as

Theories of competition and market performance

Multimarket competition and the source of potential entry
  • Arjen van Witteloostuijn
Article

Summary

An important issue in the theory of industrial organization involves the question of market performance. This paper deals with the static-dynamic efficiency trade-off. Theories of competition are reviewed and classified. The concept of workable competition offers a verbal listing of conditions facilitating both efficiency dimensions. A crucial feature of workable competition is the force of potential rivalry. The study of sources of potential entry and market games identifies cases of intermediate competition which can serve as a welfare-theoretic yardstick for the evaluation of market performance. The nature of multimarket competition proves to be essential.

Keywords

International Economic Public Finance Industrial Organization Market Performance Crucial Feature 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Arjen van Witteloostuijn
    • 1
  1. 1.Faculty of Economics and Business AdministrationUniversity of LimburgMaastrichtThe Netherlands

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