Abstract
A new solution concept is axiomatically characterized for tournaments that represent cooperative majority voting. The predicted set of outcomes lies inside the top-cycle set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set.
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This research was supported by NSF grants SES 8612120 and SES 8896228. I thank Georges Bordes, Gary Cox, Bhaskar Dutta, Richard McKelvey, Nicholas Miller, Emerson Niou, Peter Ordeshook, and Peyton Young for helpful comments. Niou is responsible for the example in Sect. 4. Presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Tucson, March 1987, and at the Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behaviorial Sciences, UCLA, October 1988.
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Schwartz, T. Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 19–29 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832917
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832917