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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 26, Issue 4, pp 439–453 | Cite as

Satisficing leads to cooperation in mutual interests games

  • Amit Pazgal
Article

Abstract

We study the play of mutual interests games by satisficing decision makers. We show that, for a high enough initial aspiration level, and under certain assumptions of “tremble”, there is a high probability (close to unity) of convergence to the Pareto dominant cooperative outcome. Simulations indicate that the theoretical result is robust with respect to the “trembling” mechanism.

Keywords

Decision Maker High Probability Theoretical Result Economic Theory Game Theory 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amit Pazgal
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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