Abstract
Having survived threats from a wide variety of ideologies (isms), religious and secular, going back to the first commandment, academic freedom is again under the gun of ideological fashion (orthodoxy, political correctness), plutocracy and feminism — at least the more extremist wings. The paper offers an analysis and justification of the traditional concept of academic freedom — the discretionary (but limited) rights of academics over a wide range of activities under the headings of teaching and research. The justification collects three lines of argument: (a) rights of the competent, (b) institutional benefits of separation of powers, and (c) the implications of fallibilism. Focus then shifts to an analysis and critique of a recent feminist revision of academic freedom. Implementing a common stratagem, freedom gets redefined as duties of affirmative action toward women (and minorities). A critique of this revision is sketched.
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Kubara, M. Academic freedom. Interchange 27, 111–123 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01807291
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01807291