Abstract
This paper provides a formal framework within which to study cooperative behavior in the presence of incomplete information, and shows how far the known results in the static cooperative game theory can readily be applied to the proposed framework. The new concepts of Bayesian society, Bayesian strong equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatible strong equilibrium are introduced and studied.
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The present paper was completed by revising Ichiishi and Idzik (1991). The authors would like to express deep gratitude to Roy Radner and an anonymous referee for their stimulating discussions and valuable suggestions. Of course, the authors are solely responsible for any possible deficiencies of the paper. The material is based upon work supported by the NSF under Award No. INT-9121247.
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Ichiishi, T., Idzik, A. Bayesian cooperative choice of strategies. Int J Game Theory 25, 455–473 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803951
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01803951