Summary
According to the so-called Starnberger Group1, the amenability of a science to science policy measures, conceptualised by the Group in terms of “finalization”, depends crucially on conditions intrinsic to the science not invariably present at every stage of its development. Finalization is possible only at junctures where the science in question faces methodologically divergent alternative lines of development. The most significant kind of case depends on the presence of “completed”, or “classical”, theories.
In this paper I shall argue that the Starnbergers have failed to vindicate any interesting variety of the thesis concerning internal scientific prerequisites of finalization; and that this is due, in part, to a failure to establish the existence of interestingly completed theories.
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References
Vide G. Böhme, W. van den Daele, and W. Krohn,Alternativen in der Wissenschaft, in W. Pohrt (Hrg.), “Wissenschaftspolitik — von wem, für wen, wie?”, München (originally published in “Zeitschrift für Soziologie”, Vol. 1, 1972); and G. Böhme, W. van den Daele, and W. Krohn,Die Finalisierung der Wissenschaft, in W. Diederich (Hrg.), “Theorien der Wissenschaftsgeschichte”, Frankfurt a. M. 1974, (originally in “Zeitschrift für Soziologie”, Vol. 2, 1973).
G. Böhmeet. al., Die Finalisierung, pp. 289–92.
Ibid., p. 289et passim.
Ibid., pp. 289–99 and pp. 287–88.
Ibid., pp. 299–303 and p. 288.
Ibid., pp. 303–310 and p. 288.
Vide M. Tietzel,Die Finalisierungsdebatte oder: Viel Lärm um nichts, in “Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie”, IX/2, 1978; and J. Schopman,Finalization and Functionalization, in “Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie”, XI/2, 1980.
G. Böhmeet al., Die Finalisierung, p. 288.
Ibid., p. 303.
Ibid., p. 287.
Ibid. pp. 305–06, and G. Böhmeet al., Alternativen, pp. 42–44.
It is impossible to present the detailed case for this claim here. The most significant discussion of the general issue is to be found i. M. Dummett,Common Sense and Physics, in G. F. Macdonald (ed.), “Perception and Identity”, London 1979.
G. Böhmeet al., Die Finalisierung, p. 304.
This interpretation is based on an alternative reading ofibid., p. 304. I ignore other possible construals of the term “universal validity”.
Ibid. p. 305 and p. 306.
Ibid. p. 305.
The proposal is based on an alternative reading ofibid. p. 305.
Ibid. p. 305.
Ibid. p. 304–05.
Helpful discussions may be found in the papers by M. Bunge and H. Skolimowski in C. Mitcham and R. Mackey (eds.), “The Philosophy of Technology”, New York/London, 1972, and in F. Rapp (ed.), “Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology”, Dordrecht, 1974.
G. Böhme,Wie kann es abgeschlossene Theorien geben?, in “Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie”, X/2, 1979.
G. Böhme et al.,Die Finalisierung, p. 294.
Ibid. p. 294
G. Böhme,Wie kann es ..., p. 346.
J. Schopman,Op. cit., p. 349.
G. Böhme,Wie kann es..., p. 346.
Ibid., p. 347.
Ibid., p. 349.
Ibid., p. 350.
Vide the brief discussion in N. R. Hanson,Observation and Explanation, London, 1971, pp. 49–60, in particular pp. 57–58.
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I wish to thank Professor Stig Andur Pedersen for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Rasmussen, S.A. Finalization and completed theories. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 13, 359–369 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801563
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801563