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Buffon's gnoseological principle

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Summary

In establishing what he called the “metaphysics of science”, the French naturalist Buffon was confronted with the problem of situating the place occupied by man in the natural world, a problem which ultimately depended on discerning his true nature. The paradox of Descartes' dualism offered various solutions — the extremes being, either to condemn man's material nature as corrupted in order to exalt his spiritual nature as a moral being, as Pascal had done, or to reduce man's pretended spiritual nature to nothing more than a manifestation of his material organization, the solution of La Mettrie. Buffon could accept neither, proves man's duality, and proceeds to establish his gnoseological principle on his critique of these two radical solutions.

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References

  1. Blaise Pascal,Pensées, § 438, 1206. We have used throughout the text of thePensées as established by Jacques Chevalier and published in his edition of theŒuvres complètes de Pascal for the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). Each reference will identify the pensée as to its number in this edition, followed by the page on which the passage is found.

  2. Georges Louis Leclerc, comte de Buffon, “De l'Age viril”, in hisHistoire naturelle, générale et particulière, avec la Description du Cabinet du Roy (Paris: De l'Imprimerie royale, 1749–1767) II, 518. All texts by Buffon quoted in this article can be found in this edition. We shall refer the reader to the texts as reproduced in theŒuvres philosophiques de Buffon, edited by Jean Piveteau (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), which will be abbreviated toO.P. and followed by page number, column letter and lines. Except for the first line, this quotation is found atO.P. 298 B 34–49.

  3. TheJournal des Sçavans for October 1748 announced the forthcoming work, giving a plan of the fifteen projected volumes which would present all of natural history, from the minerals to man, and adding that the first volume was already being printed. (Oct. 1748, 639–640).

  4. Buffon, “Premier discours: De la manière d'étudier et de traiter l'histoire naturelle”, inO.P. 7–26. For an English translation of this discourse, see John Lyon, “TheInitial Discourse to Buffon'sHistoire naturelle”, Journal of the History of Biology 9 (1976): 133–181.

  5. And here is the point where commentators have ended their inquiries. Robert Wohl in his “Buffon and his Project for a New Science” (Isis 51 (1960): 186–199), for example, has remarked the original and constructive nature of Buffon's enterprise, searching for the foundation of a new and more solid philosophy of science, but unfortunately he has not appreciated the profoundness of Buffon's thought. On this second level, Wohl has only noticed Buffon's positive construction from the methodological and logical critiques, both concerning Buffon's reaction to Descartes. The gnoseological and metaphysical critiques have gone all but unnoticed. The major error has been not to have understood Buffon's dialectical process and the real (and concrete) issues of his critiques which would follow therefrom, all which will be discussed shortly.

  6. These statements concerning “Truth” are Buffon's (not necessarily ours!), found atO.P. 23 B 20–25.

  7. The fallacy of older systems has been, according to Buffon, not to have known to distinguish correctly between what is real in a subject and what we arbitrarily invest in it, to recognize clearly those properties which belong to it and those which we image to belong. Thus from his theory of knowledge, Buffon wishes to establish a principle of ontological judgment. It is furthermore this principle regulating rational discourse which would serve as the foundation of the new philosophy of science. “... si on ne perdoit jamais de vûe ce principe, on ne feroit pas une fausse démarche, on éviteroit de tomber dans ces erreurs sçavantes qu'on reçoit souvent comme des vérités, on verroit disparoître les paradoxes, les questions insolubles des Sciences abstraites, on reconnoîtroit les préjugés & les incertitudes que nous portons nous-mêmes dans les Sciences réelles, on viendroit alors à s'entendre sur la Métaphysique des Sciences, on cesseroit de disputer, & on se réuniroit pour marcher dans la même route à la suite de l'expérience, & arriver enfin à la connoissance de toutes les vérités qui sont du ressort de l'esprit humain.”O.P. 26 B 4–20.

  8. Aristotle often uses this form of arguing: he distinguishes “Dialectics” from “Analytics” in that whereas the latter, having for object demonstration, is a process of deduction from true premises, the former, reasoning about probable opinions, uses a method of interrogation, the pitting of one thesis against another, to suscitate a new thesis which comprehends the contradiction implied in these opinions. (Analytics I, iv, 46a,Metaphysics II, i, 995b, etc.) Buffon unfortunately does not refer to the theses he criticizes by the names of any authors who might have propounded them; however, by the structure and very language of his arguments, we shall be able to infer the origins of his criticism.

  9. Concerning God as the centre of Cartesian metaphysics, Pascal could not have denied the essential role of divine goodness as the guarantee of absolute certitude. Pascal's grievance concerns the physical world: “Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes: il aurait bien voulu, dans toute saphilosophie, pouvoir se passer de Dieu; mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de lui faire donner une chiquenaude, pour mettre le monde en mouvement; après cela, il n'a plus que faire de Dieu.”Pensées § 194, 1137 (our italics).

  10. Pensées § 196, 1137. That this pensée may be legitimately taken for a continuation of his critique of Descartes, cf.Pensées § 193, 1137: “Écrire contre ceux qui approfondissent trop les sciences. Descartes.”

  11. As to the dates concerning La Mettrie's work, consult Vartanian's introduction to hisLa Mettrie's “L'homme machine”, a Study in the Origins of an Idea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); this critical edition of La Mettrie's text is the one we have used throughout, and which will be abbreviated toH.M. The work was published in late 1747 (p. 1), beginning to circulate by November or early December (p. 6).

  12. La Mettrie,H.M. 191.

  13. Buffon, “De la Nature de l'Homme”, inO.P. 294 B 50–52. The gnoseological critique is not confined to the first discourse, and we must consider various texts from the volumes of 1749 in order to establish Buffon's thought on the question of man's place in nature, the most significant being “De la Nature de l'Homme” which opens the “Histoire naturelle de l'Homme” of the second and third volumes. The “Histoire générale des Animaux” of the second volume, dated “le 27 mai 1748” (O.P. 289 B 13), had begun with a comparison of the different kingdoms of natural beings — animals, plants and minerals. Considering man in relation to the other classes, Buffon reiterates his view's concerning man's superiority as a consequence of his spiritual nature (O.P. 234 A 56-B 15), the first such statement being in thePremier discours, that man must place himself at the head of all created beings and watch “avec étonnement” the chain descend by almost imperceptible degrees from “la créature la plus parfaite jusqu'à la matière la plus informe, de l'animal le mieux organisé jusqu'au minéral le plus brut” (O.P. 10 A 32–40). If we consider however only the material aspect of our being, “nous ne sommes au dessus des animaux que par quelques rapports de plus, tels que ceux que nous donnent la langue & la main” (O.P. 233 A 29–32). But it might have been all to simple to misread the next paragraph, to construe that Buffon thought this spiritual nature to be nothing more than a result of our material organization. “En effet, que de ressorts, que de forces, que de machines & de mouvemens sont renfermez dans cette petite partie de matière qui compose le corps d'un animal! que de rapports, que d'harmonie, que de correspondance entre les parties! combien de combinaisons, d'arrangemens, de causes, d'effets, de principes, qui tous concourent au même but, & que nous ne connoissons que par des résultats si difficiles à comprendre, qu'ils n'ont cessé d'être des merveilles que par l'habitude que nous avons prise de n'y point réfléchir!” (O.P. 233 A 38- B 8) This is exactly what La Mettrie had done, and we contend that it is in fear of misinterpretation and of being accused of La Mettrian materialism that Buffon felt obliged to present for a third time in the volumes of 1749, in the chapter “De la Nature de l'Homme”, his views concerning man's dual nature, having read in the meantime La Mettrie's work. In spite of what Buffon would later pretend (“Avant-propos” to the sixth volume of theHistoire naturelle (1756), iii), we know from a letter to Gabriel Cramer that the second volume, containing this chapter, was printed at the latest around September 1748. (Françoise Weil, “La Correspondance Buffon-Cramer”Revue d'Histoire des sciences XIV-2 (1961): 129). It will become impossible to doubt that this chapter was written in reaction to La Mettrie's thesis once the numerous parallels between the two texts have been uncovered.

  14. We shall use Pascal's arguments, but the same can be found in Descartes,Discours de la méthode. Part 5. (In:Œuvres complètes ed. by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery; reprint ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1974, VI, 56–60). It should also be remarked that Locke used the same arguments to the same ends: see in particular hisAn Essay concerning Human Understanding, II, xi, § 11. In John W. Yolton's ed., (London: Dent; New York: Dutton, 1961) I, 126–127. It is in connection with his general Lockianism that Buffon would take up in turn the arguments.

  15. Pascal,Pensées, § 260, 1156.

  16. La Mettrie,H.M. 160–161.

  17. Ibid., 161.

  18. Buffon,O.P. 296 A 45–46. The structure of this first argument proves to be a first parallel between the texts of Buffon and La Mettrie.

  19. Claude Perrault, “Description des sapajous & autres guenons” in the second (and greatly enlarged) edition of hisMémoires pour servir à l'histoire naturelle des animaux (Paris: De l'Imprimerie royale, 1976), 126.

  20. This counter argument is found atO.P. 296 B 6–19. The argument is parallel to La Mettrie's in that two classes of animals are distinguished: those who are capable of reproducing sounds and those who are not. Both cases are used by La Mettrie to support his mechanistic thesis: “Parmi les Animaux, les uns apprennent à parler & à chanter; ils retiennent des airs, & prennent tous les tons, aussi exactement qu'un Musicien. Les autres, qui montrent cependant plus d'esprit, tels que le Singe, n'en peuvent venir à bout. Pourquoi cela, si ce n'est par un vice des organes de la parole?”H.N. 160.

  21. Buffon,O.P. 296 B 14–23.

  22. La Mettrie,H.N. 162: “Tout se réduit à des sons, ou à des mots, qui de la bouche de l'un, passent par l'oreille de l'autre, dans le cerveau, qui reçoit en même tems par les yeux la figure des corps, dont ces mots sont les Signes arbitraires.”

  23. Ibid., 195.

  24. “D'où peut venir cette uniformité dans tous les ouvrages des animaux? pourquoi chaque espèce ne fait-elle jamais que la même chose, de la même façon? & pourquoi chaque individu ne la fait-il ni mieux ni plus mal qu'un autre individu? y a-t-il de plus forte preuve que leurs opérations ne sont que des résultats méchaniques & purement matériels?” Buffon,O.P. 297 A 1–9.

  25. O.P. 297 A 16–19.

  26. O.P. 296 B 38–46.

  27. O.P. 297 Y 32–37.

  28. Pascal,Préface pour le traité du vide, inŒuvres complètes, 533–534. This opuscule was destined to preface theTraité du vide, projected, but never completd, by Pascal. It was however printed for the first time in Bossuet's edition of thePensées (1670) under the title “De l'autorité en matière de philosophie”, and therefore available to the eighteenth-century reader.

  29. Cf. Buffon,O.P. 294 B 50–54: “Notre ame n'a qu'une forme très-simple, très-générale, trèsconstante; cette forme est la pensée, il nous est impossible d'apercevoir notre ame autrement que par la pensée...”

  30. Buffon,O.P. 297 B 12–19.

  31. La Mettrie,H.M. 186.

  32. Ibid., 162: “Des Animaux à l'Homme, la transition n'est pas violente; les vrais Philosophes en conviendront”.

  33. Ibid., 170.

  34. Ibid., 162.

  35. “L'homme rend par un signe extérieur ce qui se passe au dedans de lui, il communique sa pensée par la parole, ce signe est commun à toute l'espèce humaine; l'homme sauvage parle comme l'homme policé, & tous deux parlent naturellement, & parlent pour se faire entendre: ...”. Buffon,O.P. 296 A 37–43. Our italics. Notice that this sentence is in direct contradiction to La Mettrie's non-violent transition as stated above.

  36. Be it the principle of irritability.

  37. La Mettrie,H.M. 189.

  38. Buffon,O.P. 295 A 7–24. The argument can of course be found in Pascal: “Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans mains, pieds, tête .... Mais je ne puis concevoir l'homme sans pensée: ce serait une pierre ou une brute.”Pensées § 258, 1156.

  39. The initial chapter, “De la Nature de l'Homme”, is followed by his natural history. The principle of the dual nature of man is a guide to the clear understanding of Buffon's anthropological endeavour. Since man, unlike other species, must be considered according to his dual nature, we must first establish his natural history as a member of the species (the individual in general) and this according to his material being (the cycle of his life: “De l'Enfance”, “De la Puberté”, “De l'Age viril”, and “De la Vieillesse et de la Mort”) and to his spiritual being (the epistemological cycle: “Du Sens de la Vue”, “De l'Odorat” and “Des Sens en général”). Considering man as an individual in particular, as an active member of society, Buffon constructs the “Variétés dans l'espèce humaine” from two perspectives again, that of an ethnograph, describing the races of man in relation to the physical habitat (material nature of man), and that of a cultural anthropologist, studying the mores and customs of the diverse peoples of the earth (spiritual nature of man).

  40. Buffon,O.P. 297 B 31–47.

  41. Buffon,O.P. 10 A 24–32.

  42. Pascal,Pensées, § 84, 1110.

  43. In his excellent article “Pascal dialecticien” (in the collection of essays published under the titlePascal présent: 1662–1962 (Clermont-Ferrand: G. de Bussac, 1962), 257–289), Pierre Magnard demonstrates that the Pascalian dialectic develops around the notions of the “nature effective” and the “idée de la nature”. “Faire apparaître cette distance entre la nature effective et son idée revient à repousser courageusement cette tentation constante de la métaphysique de prendre ses exigences pour des réalités. ... Qui dit ‘nature’ dit suffisance, totalité signifiante, réalité en soi et par soi. Une telle idée va apparaître ainsi comme la promesse d'une intelligibilité totale de l'être et comme le truchement d'une compréhension parfaite du réel. ... Pascal précisément, dans le traitement dialectique qu'il fait de cette idée, se refuse à lui conférer la moindre portée ontologique; tantót lui soumetant à la question de l'expérience, il fait voir l'irréalité, tantôt lui soumettant au réel, il rend manifeste l'absurdité de celui-ci, se fiant tour à tour à la raison, armes des pyrrhoniens, et au coeur, fort des dogmatiques, pour briser l'un sur l'autre, afin qu'ils renaissent dans la foi.” (Magnard: 261–262).

  44. Pascal,Pensées, § 84, 1105.

  45. This terminology concerning Cartesian-metaphysics, originally formulated by Ferdinand Alquié, comes from the article by Magnard, “Pascal dialecticien”, 259.

  46. Pascal,Pensées, § 84, 1107.

  47. Pensées § 80, 1104.

  48. SeePensées § 384, 1189: “Le pyrrhonisme est le vrai.” We quote no further since in this pensée we have Pascal's solution, which should not be exposed until his whole position has been analysed.

  49. Pensées § 479, 1221–1222.

  50. Pensées § 438, 1204–1205.

  51. Pensées § 84, 1106.

  52. Pensées § 84, 1111–1112. Latin quotation from St. Augustine,De Civitate Dei XXI, 10.

  53. Pensées § 84, 1109.

  54. Pensées § 84, 1108.

  55. Pensées § 84, 1109.

  56. Pensées § 255, 1156.

  57. Pensées § 84, 1106–1107.

  58. The “coincidence of opposites”, coined by Nicholas of Cusa, (De Conjecturis, II, 1 & 2), was not a principle for the positive reconciliation of contradictions in a concrete unitary system, but rather a principle to actively negate the contraries in the Divine. It is evident that Pascal has used this principle as the solution of his own paradoxes; just as Nicholas used the mathematical example of the infinite diameter coinciding with the circumference of its circle (De docta ignorantia, I, 13, et sq.), so Pascal argued that the centre of all things and the circumference of the infinite sphere, the first principles and the infinite, “se touchent et se réunissent à force de s'être éloignées [i.e. “les extrémités”], et se retrouvent en Dieu, et en Dieu seulement.”Pensées § 84, 1108. Concerning Nicholas of Cusa and the principle of coincidence, see Kurt Flasch,Nikolaus von Kues: Die Idee der Koinzidenz, inGrundprobleme der großen Philosophen: Philosophie des Altertums und des Mittelalters, edited by Josef Speck (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 221–261.

  59. Pensées § 254, 1155.

  60. Alexander Pope,Essai sur l'Homme. Par M. Pope. Traduit d l'anglois en françois [by Etienne de Silhouette]. Londres: P. Dunoyer; Amsterdam: J.-F. Bernard, 1736. We mention this French translation in particular because it is probably this one that Buffon sent to Etienne-François Du Tour, announced in a letter to the latter dated February 16, 1739 (published in “Lettres inédites de Buffon”,Buffon édité par le Muséum national d'histoire naturelle (Paris: Publications françaises, 1952), 191).

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  61. In her study of theCourant pascalien et courant antipascalien (1670–1734) (Brussel: M. Hayes, 1932), Johanna Theodora van Konijnenburg concludes that Voltaire's remarks are too superficial and lacking systematization could not be a match for the profoundness of thePensées.

  62. Buffon,O.P. 18 A 2–14.

  63. Pascal,Pensées § 84, 1110.

  64. Buffon,O.P. 294 A, 16–19: “... & notre sens intérieur, notre ame a-t-elle rien de semblable, rien qui lui soit commun avec la nature de ces organes extérieurs?” This “sens intérieur” seens to be thefaculty of reflection of Locke.

  65. Buffon,O.P. 294 A 34–54.

  66. Buffon,O.P. 194 B 27–28.

  67. Buffon,O.P. 293 B 46–294 A 3. Our italics.

  68. Alexander Pope,Essay on Man I, 17–20. We have consulted the edition by Maynard Mack in the collectionThe Poems of Alexander Pope (London: Methuen, 1958), vol. III-i, but for the convenience of the reader we shall refer to the verses by their Epistle and verse numbers.

  69. Buffon,O.P. 10 A 24–32.

  70. O.P. 10 A 32–37.

  71. O.P. 233 A 37.

  72. Pope,Essay on Man, I, 23–28, 35–36.

  73. Buffon,O.P, 5 A 36-B 1.

  74. O.P. 9 B 55–10 A 7; then 25 A 30–32.

  75. Pope,Essay, II, 1–2.

  76. Buffon,O.P. 10 A 8–13. Our italics.

  77. See Buffon,O.P. 23 A 10–18.

  78. O.P. 26 B 18–20.

  79. O.P. 25 A 15–16.

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Dougherty, F.W.P. Buffon's gnoseological principle. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 11, 238–253 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800908

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