Summary
The non-statement view of scientific theories contains a new conception of theoreticity: A function is „T-theoretical“ if T must be presupposed for its calculation. On the basis of this conception some philosophers came to the conclusion that scientific theories are not empirically testable because they contain T-theoretical functions. It is claimed that the attempt to test them ends in a circularity: The test of T presupposes T itself.
It can be shown, however, that this argument is erroneous. The use of a theory to calculate T-theoretical functions does not preserve that theory from empirical criticism. The postulated circularity does not arise.
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Gadenne, V. Theoretische Begriffe und die Prüfbarkeit von Theorien. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 16, 19–24 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800832
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01800832