Public Choice

, Volume 73, Issue 4, pp 459–487 | Cite as

An assessment of voting system simulations

  • Hannu Nurmi
Article

Abstract

In applying the results of the social choice theory to voting procedures, the question arises as to how often the various anomalies can be expected to occur. Computer simulations and probability modelling are common approaches to address this problem. This article is an attempt to find out the robustness of the so-called impartial culture assumption. For this purpose first a major perturbation of the impartial culture assumption is considered and, thereafter, we focus on a few minor modifications of the assumption.

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hannu Nurmi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

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