Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
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The set of payoffs for the strong equilibria is characterized for supergames when the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means and where no coalition can correlate its strategies in a randomized way.
It is proven that this set is identical to the set of payoffs of the strong perfect equilibria. On the other hand an example is given to demonstrate that perfection is a significant notion in supergames where the evaluation relations are according to the overtaking criterion.
KeywordsEconomic Theory Game Theory Evaluation Relation Strong Equilibrium Significant Notion
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