Skip to main content
Log in

On the structure of the set of perfect equilibria in bimatrix games

  • Theoretical Papers
  • Published:
Operations-Research-Spektrum Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Summary

In this paper attention is focussed on the structure of the set of perfect equilibria. It turns out that the structure of this set resembles the structure of the Nash equilibrium set. Maximal Selten subsets are introduced to take the role of maximal Nash subsets. It is found that the set of perfect equilibria is the finite union of maximal Selten subsets. Furthermore it is shown that the dimension relation for maximal Nash subsets can be extended to faces of such sets. As a result a dimension relation for maximal Selten subsets is derived.

Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende Arbeit ist der Struktur der Menge perfekter Gleichgewichte gewidmet. Es stellt sich heraus, daß die Struktur dieser Menge der Struktur der Menge der Nash Gleichgewichte ähnlich ist. Maximale Selten Mengen werden eingeführt, um die Rolle der maximalen Nash Menge zu übernehmen. Es wird gezeigt, daß die Menge perfekter Gleichgewichte aus endlich vielen maximalen Selten Mengen zusammengestellt ist. Außerdem wird die Dimension maximaler Selten Mengen beschrieben.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Bohnenblust HF, Karlin S, Shapley LS (1950) Solutions of discrete two-person games. Ann Math Stud 24:51–72

    Google Scholar 

  • Damme EEC van (1983) Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gale D, Sherman S (1950) Solutions of finite two-person games. Ann Math Stud 24:37–49

    Google Scholar 

  • Heuer GA, Millham CB (1976) On Nash subsets and mobility chains in bimatrix games. Nav Res Logist Q 23:311–319

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jansen MJM (1981) Maximal Nash subsets for bimatrix games. Nav Res Logist Q 28:147–152

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jansen MJM, Jurg AP, Borm PEM (1993) On strictly perfect sets. Games Econ Beh (to appear)

  • Kuhn HW (1961) An algorithm for equilibrium points in bimatrix games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 47:1656–1662

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millham CB (1972) Constructing bimatrix games with special properties. Nav Res Logist Q 19:709–714

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millham CB (1974) On Nash subsets of bimatrix games. Nav Res Logist Q 21:307–317

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nash JF (1951) Noncooperative games. Ann Math 54:286–295

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Selten R (1975) Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. Int J Game Theory 4:25–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shapley LS, Snow RN (1950) Basic solutions of discrete games. Ann Math Stud 24:27–35

    Google Scholar 

  • Vorobev NN (1958) Equilibrium points in bimatrix games. Theory Probab Appl 3:297–309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Winkels HM (1979) An algorithm to determine all equilibrium points of a bimatrix game. In: Moeschlin O, Pallaschke D (eds) Game theory and related topics. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp 137–148

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Borm, P.E.M., Jansen, M.J.M., Potters, J.A.M. et al. On the structure of the set of perfect equilibria in bimatrix games. OR Spektrum 15, 17–20 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01783413

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01783413

Key words

Schlüsselwörter

Navigation