Necessary conditions are established for a point contained in the interior or boundary of a convex feasible subset of Euclidean space to be quasi-undominated in an anonymous simple game. Most of the conditions are behaviorally intuitive and imply pariwise symmetries among utility gradients.
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Matthews, S.A. Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting equilibria. Int J Game Theory 9, 141–156 (1980). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01781369
- Economic Theory
- Euclidean Space
- Game Theory
- Symmetry Condition
- Simple Game