The Sequential Truel is a three-person game which generalizes the simple duel. The players' positions are fixed at the vertices of an equilateral triangle, and they fire, in sequence, until there is only one survivor or until each survivor has fired a pre-specified number of times. The rules of the particular game may or may not permit the tactic of abstention, i.e. firing into the air. Several versions of Sequential Truel (with and without abstention) are examined here. It is found that, often, there is a single equilibrium point which can be called the solution of the truel for rational players. Quite frequently, the poorest marksman of the three has the greatest payoff at this equilibrium point.
KeywordsEquilibrium Point Economic Theory Game Theory Equilateral Triangle Great Payoff
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